The first chapter contrasting this notion of context with a different one that has played a central role in theorizing about indexical and other context-sensitive expressions: David Kaplan's notion of a context as a sequence of parameters, each of which is a feature of the concrete situation in which the discourse is taking place, and each of which is potentially relevant to the interpretation of some particular context-sensitive expression. In Kaplan's abstract semantic theory, and in a modification of it developed by David Lewis, context can be represented by a centered possible world: a possible world with a designated time and person (representing a participant in the relevant conversation, and a particular point in time in the conversation.) I argue that the two notions of context are complementary, each with a role to play in the explanation of speech, but that some tensions arise when they are confused with each other.
The second chapter elaborates and extends some ideas of Paul Grice about the basic concepts of a theoretical account of communication. Grice's idea was to explain a notion of speaker meaning in a way that is independent of any account of an institutional practice of linguistic communication, and than to explain languages and language games as devices for accomplish the purpose of meaning things. We can better understand, Grice argued, how the practice of linguistic communication works by separating, as best we can, the functions that language serves from the means that it uses to serve them. I argue that we should extend this general idea to the notion of common ground: while the evolving body of information that guides a conversation is a resource for the interpretation of conventional speech acts, and is changed in conventional ways by them, the general idea of common ground is intelligible independently of linguistic rules. Some of the ways contexts change are explained by general principles of rational cooperative action in a way that is analogous to Grice's use of truisms about rational communication to explain conversational implicatures. "The autonomy of pragmatics" is the slogan I use to label the general idea that it is possible and fruitful to theorize about the functions and dynamics of discourse independently of specific theories about the mechanisms that languages use to serve those functions.
The third chapter applies these general ideas to the explanation of linguistic phenomena concerning presupposition. Speaker presupposition is what a speaker takes to be common ground, and it is argued that regularities concerning the presuppositions carried by particular words and constructions should be described in terms of what speakers must be presupposing in order for their speech acts to be intelligible and cooperative contributions to the conversation.
Pragmatic explanation needs to be distinguished from compositional semantic mechanisms, but it is argued in the fourth chapter that the two kinds of explanation interact throughout the process of interpretation. Complex expressions give rise to subordinate or derived contexts, for example when one makes a conditional supposition, and then operates in a context in which that supposition is temporarily taken to be common ground. This interaction, and some apparatus to help model it, is discussed in the fourth chapter.
The remaining chapters focus mostly on the information in the common ground that is about the conversational participants themselves -their mutual knowledge, or presumed knowledge, of their place in the world, and of the epistemic principles by which their decisions about how the context changes should be determined. The fifth chapter is about self-locating information -not just who where an individual take himself or herself to be, but who and where a group of interacting individuals take themselves and each other to be. A modified version of David Lewis's way of using centered possible worlds to represent self-locating information is developed, and used to clarify self-locating communication. While participants in a conversation need not know who they are, or who they are talking to, they do need to have a mutual way of identifying each other, and the account developed provides for this. The idea is to represent the possibilities distinguished in the common ground as centered possibilities, centered not on a single individual and time, but on a sequence of individuals (the participants in the conversation) and a time.
The next two chapters focus mostly on vexed questions about deontic and epistemic modals -the use of words such as 'may' 'might' and 'must', along with indicative conditionals, which are a kind of epistemic modal. In chapter six use a simple artificial language game of command and permission invented by David Lewis to help, by analogy, to model the behavior of epistemic 'might'. What is distinctive about Lewis's game is that the interpretation of statements of command and permission is prospective: When the master tells the slave what he may or must do, she makes the statement of obligation or permission true by saying it. In Lewis's simple game, the master has absolute authority, while in more realistic cases, and with epistemic modals, there may be no clear lines of authority, so the settling of what possibilities should be included or excluded is a matter of negotiation, but I argue that the interpretation is prospective in a way that is like the deontic case: One proposes to change the context to make the possibility or necessity statement true in the revised context. And I argue that this kind of interpretation helps to explain some puzzling features of the behavior of epistemic modals. Chapter seven continues the discussion by looking at cases of disagreement about how the context should change, of the role of the interpretation of epistemic modals in such negotiations, and of the distinction between a use of modal expressions to express epistemic priorities and a use to make factual claims.
The semantic apparatus used to interpret indicative conditionals and epistemic modals is thoroughly truth-conditional, even when they are used to express attitudes and epistemic priorities that may, in the end, not be settled by the facts. In the final chapter, I argue that the best way to make sense of the kind of semantic relativism recently defended by such philosophers as John MacFarlane, Mark Richard and Max Köbel is in terms of a tension between two ways of individuating possible worlds: one the one hand, we individuate possibilities in whatever way we must to model disagreement; on the hand, we individuate them by what there is a fact of the matter about. Since what there is a fact of the matter about may itself be a subject of disagreement, it is useful to have a framework that need not settle this kind of question in advance. There are different versions of semantic relativism, and I argue that this way of thinking about relativism fits with some but not all relativist theses.
